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99 
Chapter 3: Takings Issues 
Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in 
Regulatory Takings 
Michael M. Berger* 
Ten years ago, Dan Mandelker and I co-authored a short piece on 
ripeness in regulatory takings cases, the title of which clearly tipped 
our collective hands: A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify 
the Law of Regulatory Takings.1 The situation was confused then,2 
and it has not improved with age. Dan’s passion for correcting the 
ripeness situation has led to his active involvement in the last two 
sessions of the United States Congress to seek a legislative solution 
to a judicially-created morass.3 Accordingly the ripeness mess in land 
 
 * Shareholder in Berger & Norton, Santa Monica, California; Adjunct Professor in The 
Graduate Program in Real Property Development, University of Miami School of Law; J.D. 
1967, Washington University; LL.M. 1968, University of Southern California. In the spirit of 
full disclosure, I should note that I have spent virtually my entire legal career representing 
property owners in litigation against government agencies in either direct or inverse 
condemnation actions. In fact, I was counsel of record in a number of the decisions that this 
article analyzes.  
 1. Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, 42 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST, 1, 
3 (1990). I was a student and research assistant of Professor Mandelker’s at Washington 
University in 1966 and 1967. Although I have, on more than one occasion, publicly 
acknowledged my indebtedness to Dan for teaching me issues of constitutional law that were 
generally ignored in traditional constitutional law classes, we have differed almost uniformly on 
substantive issues involving the relationship between municipalities and property owners. 
Compare Daniel R. Mandelker, et al., The White River Junction Manifesto , 9 VT. L. REV. 193 
(1984) with Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction 
Manifesto: A Reply to the “Gang of Five’s” Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking 
of Property, 19 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 685 (1986). However, on the ripeness issue, we always have 
been in harmony; hence, that sole joint effort during our long association. 
 2. I elaborated on the situation shortly thereafter. See Michael M. Berger, The 
“Ripeness” Mess in Federal Land Use Cases, or How the Supreme Court Converted Federal 
Judges into Fruit Peddlers, in INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 
(1991). 
 3. See, e.g., John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness 
Mess”? A Call for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. 
LAW. 195, 234 (1999) (attaching a transcript of Dan’s testimony on H.R. 1534 before the House 
Judiciary Committee). 
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use litigation seems an altogether fitting subject with which to salute 
his career. This article, therefore, is an unabashed brief in support of 
Dan’s position. The present rules are so stacked in favor of regulatory 
agencies that they virtually fly on autopilot, employing ever-shifting 
ruses to block federal court consideration of regulatory takings. The 
regulatory taking ripeness rules are in need of critical evaluation and 
overdue reform. 
In a nutshell, the problem is that government action taking private 
property for public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment is 
uncontestably an issue of federal constitutional law. After all, takings 
law deals with the meaning of a federal constitutional guarantee that 
is central to the Bill of Rights. As the California Supreme Court once 
put it: 
While acknowledging the power of government to preserve 
and improve the quality of life for its citizens through the 
regulation of the use of private land, we cannot countenance 
the service of this legitimate need through the uncompensated 
destruction of private property rights. Such Fifth Amendment 
property rights have been equated by the constitutional 
draftsmen with the cherished personal protections against self-
incrimination, double jeopardy, and the guarantee of due 
process of law. These rights are protected by the same 
amendment.4 
Ostensibly, federal decisional law is the same; federal courts are the 
guardians of the Constitution and they retain the authority to construe 
its provisions authoritatively.5 
Whatever the theory, in practice, the federal courts do not want to 
litigate the plainly federal issues arising in land use cases. In the old 
days, judges issued abstention orders when property owners had the 
temerity to seek federal court application of the federal constitution. 
Those orders required the owners to repair to state court to see 
whether resolution of state law issues might moot or, at least, confine 
the federal issues.6 This shunted many regulatory taking cases into 
 
 4. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), aff’d 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1893) 
 6. See, e.g., Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1982); 
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state courts.7 
Then, the Supreme Court got into the act. In 1985, the Court 
decided Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank.8 The case seemed simple enough. In the process of 
developing a large subdivision in Nashville Tennessee, a developer 
ran into a county planning director who imposed new regulations and 
requirements mid-project, violating the time-honored American 
tradition against changing the rules in the middle of the game. As a 
result, the developer went “belly up.” This is why Hamilton Bank (a 
lender, not a developer) became the plaintiff in constitutional 
litigation. At trial, the jury awarded Hamilton Bank $350,000 for the 
temporary taking, but the judge held that no compensation could be 
awarded for the taking. An appellate court reinstated the jury’s 
verdict.9 That is when “ripeness,” which had been merely a minor 
problem up to that point, turned into a swampy mess. This article 
addresses the most recent additions roiling that swamp. 
I. WILLIAMSON COUNTY BAITS THE TRAP 
It suffices for now to note that Williamson County was simply one 
in a series of cases in which the Supreme Court ducked the issue of 
the constitutional remedy for a regulatory taking.10 As such, the 
 
Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1984); Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City 
of Martinsville, 370 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff’d 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974); Hill v. 
City of El Paso, 437 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 7. See generally Brian Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property 
Owners: The Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA 
PROP. L.J. 73 (1988). 
 8. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). For contemporary commentaries from opposite sides of the 
counsel table, see R. Marlin Smith, The Hamilton Bank Decision: Regulatory Inverse 
Condemnation Claims Encounter Some New Obstacles, 29 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 
(1985) and Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 
39 (1985). 
 9. Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Reg. Plan. Commn., 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 
1984). 
 10. If you are reading this article, you likely have some understanding of the litigational 
maelstrom that engulfed regulatory takings cases from 1980 through 1987. If not, read one of 
the many descriptions of the Supreme Court’s repeated attempts to answer the simple question, 
“what is the constitutional remedy for a regulatory taking?” My favorites, written immediately 
before and immediately after the Court finally answered the question in 1987 are: Michael M. 
Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 261 (1987) and Michael M. Berger, 
Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-
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decision ordinarily would not warrant more than a passing blip on the 
radar screen. Each time, the Court decided the case for which it had 
granted certiorari, and on which the parties and their numerous amici 
curiae had spent enormous effort and expense, was not sufficiently 
ripe for the court to decide the substantive issue. In Williamson 
County, however, the Court expanded on the doctrine of ripeness in 
regulatory taking cases transforming the ripeness doctrine from a 
minor anomaly into a procedural monster. Refinement did not yield 
clarification; quite the contrary.11 
In Williamson County, the Court held that property owners must 
leap two hurdles before seeking Fifth Amendment relief on the merits 
in federal court. First, property owners must obtain a final 
determination from a regulatory agency about what use the agency 
will permit on their land. Following that, they must seek just 
compensation in state court. This article focuses on the latter 
requirement. In particular, it deals with an insidious trap created by 
the interplay between Williamson County’s state court relief hurdle 
and general rules of claim and issue preclusion. 
Williamson County clearly held that a property owner’s suit 
seeking compensation under the Fifth Amendment for a regulatory 
taking or under the Fourteenth Amendment for deprivation of 
property without due process of law is premature, and cannot be 
brought in a United States district court until the owner first seeks, 
and is denied, compensation in state court.12 When property owners 
follow Williamson County and first sue in state court, they are met in 
some federal circuits with the argument that the state court litigation, 
far from ripening the federal cause of action, instead has extinguished 
it. Under these courts’ reasoning, the state proceedings are res 
judicata , and thus bar the pursuit of the now-ripened federal action. 
Thus, the very act of ripening a case also ends it. That bizarre rule 
cannot be what the Williamson County court intended because it is 
inherently nonsensical and self-stultifying. One distinguished law 
 
Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735 (1988). 
 11. See Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court 
Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?  30 URB. LAW. 
307, 327-33 (1998). 
 12. See infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/5
p+99+Berger.doc  1/10/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings 103 
 
 
professor put it precisely, if a bit colloquially: 
One understandable reaction to the prong two requirement of 
[Williamson County] is that it perpetrates a fraud or hoax on 
landowners. The courts say, ‘Your suit is not ripe until you 
seek compensation from the state courts,’ but when the 
landowner does these things, the court says, ‘Ha ha, now it is 
too late.’13 
Obviously, this is only a trap for plaintiff property owners who 
want to litigate federal claims in federal court. No other species of 
litigant seeking relief on federal constitutional grounds is subjected to 
this run-around;14 but government agencies like the status quo just 
fine. In fact, government lawyers have learned to play the ripeness 
game like Perlman on a Stradivarius. Essentially all ripeness rules 
preclude any court from reviewing the legality of regulatory actions. 
The Williamson County rule prevents aggrieved property owners 
from, and protects municipalities against, having agency action 
reviewed by federal courts. So potent are these rules that one 
commentator aptly concluded that, “the Williamson County . . . 
ripeness requirements have as often been used by localities as a 
sword rather than as a shield.”15 Ripeness rules are used as an 
offensive weapon to delay litigation, increase both fiscal and 
emotional costs to the property owner, and convince potential 
plaintiffs that they should not even try to “fight city hall.”16 
The Williamson County Court decided (a) whether a claim was 
ripe for litigation in federal court and (b) that certain things first must 
be done in state court before the federal constitutional claims are ripe 
for federal court litigation. 
 
 13. Thomas Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Land-Use Litigation, in TAKINGS: 
LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY T AKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS, 
(ABA, Callies ed., 1996). 
 14. See infra  notes 102-13 and accompanying text. 
 15. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY T AKINGS 639 (1996).  
 16. See Gregory Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 98 (1995) ([M]unicipalities may have an incentive to exacerbate this problem [of the 
delay inherent in ripening a case], as stalling is often the functional equivalent of winning on 
the merits); see also JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MATTERS 296-98 (Free Press 1997) (“The 
name of this game is transaction costs . . .. [s]ubstantive legal doctrines mean little if you cannot 
get into court in the first place.”). 
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The Court’s analytical discussion begins with the announced 
conclusion that “respondent’s claim is premature.”17 Notably the 
Court chose to use the term “premature,” rather than “moribund;” the 
Court did not say there was no valid claim.18 To an English-speaking 
person, prematurity necessarily means that something is yet to be 
done to make the matter mature, or jurisprudentially ripe. The 
Williamson County court then states that, because of the lack of a 
final administrative decision and an attempt to seek compensation in 
state court, respondent’s claim is not ripe.”19 The absence of ripeness 
necessarily means that things need to, and can, be done to make the 
matter ripe. 
Throughout the opinion, the Court returns to these twin concepts, 
emphasizing and reemphasizing the temporal nature of its holding, 
repeatedly saying that land use cases can be ripened and then 
litigated in federal court. For example, the Court stated, “[a] second 
reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that respondent did not seek 
compensation through the procedures the State has provided for 
doing so.”20 The Court also observed “[s]imilarly, if a State provides 
an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property 
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until 
it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.”21 
Finally the Court said, “until [plaintiff] has utilized that procedure, its 
taking claim is premature.”22 
Indeed, the plain message of Williamson County is that federal 
claims of a local government agency’s violation of property rights 
protected by the due process and just compensation guarantees of the 
fifth and fourteenth Amendments do not even arise until after 
conclusion of the state court litigation. 
 
 17. 473 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added). 
 18. The court could not state this. Federal courts had dealt with such claim as they 
routinely deal with other Bill of Rights claims, for years. See, e.g., Nemmers v. City of 
Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 8th Cir. 1985); Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 
1141 9th Cir. 1983); Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1982); Fountain v. Metro 
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038 (11th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 
1188 (5th Cir. 1981); Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 19. 473 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. at 194 (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
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As the Court noted, “a property owner has not suffered a violation 
of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully 
attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures 
provided by the State for obtaining such compensation . . ..”23 
Thus, Williamson County is replete with the twin concepts of “not 
yet” and “not until.” There simply is no rational way for an English-
speaking person to read Williamson County other than holding that 
property owners can satisfy those newly-minted ripeness 
requirements and thereby render their claim ripe for federal court 
litigation; but that is not what has happened. 
II. LOWER COURTS PULL THE SWITCH 
Lower federal courts either have been unwilling to follow 
Williamson County or have had trouble understanding the Supreme 
Court’s message.24 Despite the clarity of the Supreme Court’s 
 
 23. 473 U.S. at 195 emphasis added. In so holding, the Court obviously overlooked 42 
U.S.C. § 4651(8), which imposes a duty on government to conduct itself so as to make it 
unnecessary for property owners to sue in inverse condemnation. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. 
v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984). All states have adopted counterpart statutes. See, e.g., CAL. 
GOV’T. CODE § 7267.6 (West 1999). Candidly, I have always had trouble with the Court’s idea 
that no federal claim can arise until state courts deny compensation. The Fifth Amendment is a 
model of clarity; it proclaims: “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation.” Logically and realistically, that guarantee is breached when a government 
agency takes property and refuses to pay. It does not take a lawsuit to establish the 
government’s refusal to pay. In any inverse taking case, whether regulatory or not, the refusal is 
palpable. Indeed, if the government agreed to pay, there would be no lawsuit; it is all rather 
tautological. Failure to pay is, by itself, a direct violation of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee. 
The Fifth Amendment does not provide anything about unsuccessful recourse to state courts as 
a part of the violation. Indeed, the Court seems to have acknowledged this shortly after 
Williamson County. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 320 (1987), the Court explained that Williamson County held that “an illegitimate 
taking might not occur until the government refuses to pay . . ..” (emphasis added), without any 
reference to whether a state court had refused to order such payment. See Kanner, Snark, supra 
note 12, at 328. “[l]ikewise, because the Constitution does not require pretaking compensation, 
and is instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate provision for obtaining compensation after 
the taking, the State’s action here is not ‘complete’ until the State fails to provide adequate 
compensation for the taking.” 473 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added). “. . . even if viewed as a 
question of due process, respondent’s claim is premature.” 473 U.S. at 199 (emphasis added). 
The opinion ends as it began, with this conclusion: “In sum, respondent’s claim is premature, 
whether it is analyzed as a deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” 473 
U.S. at 200 (emphasis added). 
 24. Either that, or they make some sort of attempt to psych out the Court’s true intent. I 
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language, some courts have concluded that once state court litigation 
has taken place, standard doctrines of claim and issue preclusion bar 
any later litigation, regardless of what Williamson County may have 
said. 
A particularly egregious illustration appears in the saga of Tom 
and Doris Dodd of Oregon. The Dodds purchased 40 acres of land in 
a secluded area on which they intended to build one home in which to 
live out their retirement, they were prevented from doing so by the 
local regulators.25 Complying with Williamson County , they sought 
redress in state court. In their state court pleadings, the Dodds raised 
only state law issues, and expressly reserved litigation of their federal 
claims for federal court. The Oregon courts honored that reservation 
and limited their decisions to issues of state law.26 
After state courts denied them relief, the Dodds sued in a United 
States district court, where a judge dismissed their suit based on lack 
of ripeness for failure to submit the federal, as well as state, issues to 
the state courts. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision. In strong language, the Ninth Court rejected the notion that 
Williamson County required the property owners to present their Fifth 
Amendment claims to the state courts. Recognizing the potential 
 
actually had a judge at a Ninth Circuit oral argument tell me that the Supreme Court’s hidden 
Williamson County message was really that the federal courts should not get involved in 
regulatory taking cases, ever. Why the Court wants to hide such an important message has not 
been explained. If that was the Court’s purpose it could easily have said that directly; but it did 
not. That Ninth Circuit comment during my oral argument presaged an opinion affirming a 
district court decision holding that there is no way for a property owner ever to litigate Fifth 
Amendment questions in federal court. The court concluded that the upshot of Williamson 
County was that all such litigation must take place in state courts, with recourse to the United 
States Supreme Court as the only possible access to the federal system. See Hayward Exchange, 
Inc. v. City of Oakland, No. 93-2206, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d No. 
94-15530, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34280 (9th Cir. 1995)). Of course, the Supreme Court had 
already held to the contrary in st ressing that a petition for certiorari is “an inadequate substitute” 
for trial in a U.S. District Court, because “[h]ow the facts are found will often dictate the 
decision of federal claims.” England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 
(1964). 
 25. The severity of Oregon’s regulatory climate is apparent in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374 (1994), as well as the omnipresent bumper sticker “Don’t Californicate Oregon,” 
a scatological allusion to the Golden State’s perceived overdevelopment. Ironically, however, 
recent press reports indicate that Oregon’s land use policies now are causing a replication of 
Los Angeles’ urban patterns and densities in Portland. See D. J. Waldie, Do the Voters Really 
Hate Sprawl?  N. Y. T IMES, Mar. 3, 2000. 
 26. Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852, 857 (9th Cir. 1995) (Dodd I). 
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impact of res judicata , the court stated: 
Reduced to its essence, to hold that a taking plaintiff must first 
present a Fifth Amendment claim to the state court system as a 
condition precedent to seeking relief in a federal court would 
be to deny a federal forum to every takings claimant. We are 
satisfied that Williamson County may not be interpreted to 
command such a revolutionary concept and draconian result.27 
After dealing with res judicata , or claim preclusion, the court 
ended on an ominous note by remanding the case to the district court 
to consider collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, on the theory that 
factual issues had been litigated that could apply to the federal claims 
as well as the state claims.28 
On remand, the district court seized on that statement and found 
that all the facts had been litigated in state court.29 Having baited the 
Dodds with its first opinion, the Ninth Circuit switched with its 
second, affirming the district court dismissal.30 
What happened to the Rainey Brothers Construction Company in 
Tennessee was even worse than what happened to the Dodds. Rainey 
Brothers wanted to develop apartments on fourteen acres of vacant 
land in Memphis, Tennessee. After obtaining permits, Rainey 
Brothers began construction of 165 apartment units. After the 
foundations were constructed and much of the wood framing had 
been completed for the project, the city, without notice, revoked the 
permits. Worse than that, the city changed the elevation requirements, 
also without prior notice or hearing, and demanded that Rainey 
Brothers construct the project five feet higher. The city’s new 
requirement necessitated the removal of all that had been built to date 
and a massive importation of earth fill to raise the ground level. 
 
 27. Dodd, 59 F.3d at 860-61 (Dodd I). 
 28. Dodd, 59 F.3d at 863 (Dodd I). 
 29.  This will always be the case in a Williamson County situation, because there is only a 
single set of facts by which the local land use regulators either acted arbitrarily toward the land 
owners or acted in such a way as to take the economically beneficial or productive use of their 
property. 
 30. Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998) (Dodd II). Adding insult 
to injury, the Dodd II court lectured the plaintiffs on the asserted impropriety of asking the 
federal courts to decide issues—even constitutional ones—arising from zoning controversies, 
overlooking what it plainly said in Dodd I (authored by the same judge). 
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When Rainey Brothers sued in state court, the city decided it had 
no stomach for trial: 
On the first day of the [state court] trial, the City Attorney, 
representing the City and the Board, stipulated in open court 
that the Board and the City had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, 
and illegally . . . [and] [i]n essence, defendants stipulated that 
they had violated plaintiff’s rights under both the Tennessee 
and United States Constitutions.31 
Notwithstanding this concession of liability, and the state court’s 
consequent finding that the government’s actions were “void, 
capricious, arbitrary and illegal,”32 the state court refused to award 
Rainey Brothers any compensation because of its erroneous belief 
that the state’s tort claims act immunized the government from any 
constitutional compensation.33 The court also refused to order 
reinstatement of the wrongfully rescinded permits.34 Thus, the Court 
upheld their rights with empty words, while denying them any 
remedy whatsoever. 
After unsuccessfully appealing the state court denial of 
compensation, Rainey Brothers filed suit in United States district 
court, in accordance with Williamson County.35 The Rainey Brothers 
sought compensation for the deprivation of its property without due 
process and the taking of its property without just compensation. The 
district court dismissed the action on the ground that the Tennessee 
proceedings, although concededly wrongly decided, were res 
judicata .36 The Sixth Circuit affirmed.37 Other cases have reached the 
same Catch-22 result, disregarding Williamson County’s clear 
 
 31. Rainey Brothers Construction Co., Inc. v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 967 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (W.D. Tenn. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 36. Id. In its Sixth Circuit brief, the City conceded that “the state court incorrectly held 
that no monetary award would be granted because Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205 precluded 
such an award . . ..” Brief for Appellees at 30 (emphasis added), Rainey Brothers Construction 
Co., Inc. v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, No. 97-5897, 1990 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 6396 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 1999). 
 37. Rainey Brothers, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 6396. 
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instruction that, once a case had been ripened by presenting it to state 
courts, it could then be litigated in federal court.38 
III. A NINTH CIRCUIT SHELL GAME PUTS SOME ENGLISH ON THE 
CLASSIC BAIT AND SWITCH 
The federal judiciary has taken on the persona of the guy in the 
fancy shirt with the smooth patter who is moving the shells around, 
casting property owners as the rubes standing in front of the table 
thinking they know where the pea went. Under the current state of the 
law, the only meaningful thing a lawyer can tell a property-owning 
client is that there is no way to know which shell hides the pea; plan 
on guessing wrong and hope for the best. 
If you think the current state of the law is not this bad, read on. A 
twist on the ripeness issue involves the melding of some concepts 
developed in the law of abstention. The facts in Fields v. Sarasota 
Manatee Airport Authority39 set the stage. In Fields, neighbors of the 
Tampa Airport sought compensation for the taking of noise and 
aviation easements over their properties because of the noxious by-
products of the aircraft using the airport.40 As required by Williamson 
 
 38. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th Cir. 
1998); Palomar Mobilehome Park Assn. v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364-65 (9th Cir. 
1993); Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 726-29 (3d Cir. 1989). While 
growing, this disregard of Williamson County is not uniform. Other circuits have attempted to 
give meaning to the Supreme Court’s direction by concluding that some mechanism must exist 
for plaintiffs to modify the normal impact of the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. For 
example, in New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 985 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1993), the court 
held that the federal case could not be time-barred at a time when it was still premature to file 
because, under Williamson County, such federal suits do not ripen until state litigation is 
concluded. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, applying a rule developed in a different context 
by the Fifth Circuit, concluded that property owners may obtain a trial on the merits in federal 
court if they file a “reservation” in state court submitting only state law issues to the state court, 
and reserving federal issues for a later trial in federal court. See Front Royal & Warren County 
Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 1998); Fields v. Sarasota 
Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992); Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 
531 F.2d 1331, 1332 (5th Cir. 1976). For further discussion of reservations, see infra notes 42-
46 and accompanying text. 
 39. 953 F.2d 1299. 
 40. Id. at 1302. For fuller discussion of such litigation, see Michael Berger, Nobody Loves 
an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631 (1970) and Michael Berger, Airport Noise in the 1980s: It’s 
Time for Aiport Operators To Acknowledge the Injury They Inflict on Neighbors, in INSTITUTE 
ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1987). 
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County, the property owners filed suit in state court seeking 
compensation under Florida law, but raising no claims under the 
federal constitution.41 The property owners did not inform the state 
court that they intended to raise those federal issues later. The state 
court erroneously held that no taking had occurred.42 When the 
property owners then sued in federal court on what they thought was 
a ripe claim, the district court granted the airport authority’s motion 
for summary judgment, which was affirmed on appeal.43 
The property owners thought they had kept their eyes on the pea; 
where had it gone? That is where the abstention twist comes in. 
When a suit containing federal issues which can either be eliminated 
or significantly altered by state court determination of state issues is 
filed in federal court, then the federal court can abstain from the 
exercise of its jurisdiction. The federal court, in effect, permits the 
state court to rule on the state law issues, in the hope that the state 
court’s resolution will moot the federal constitutional issues.44 The 
federal case is not dismissed; it is merely deferred. However, in order 
to preserve the right to return to federal court it is necessary to 
unambiguously reserve the federal issues for federal court litigation;45 
no rule, statute, or decision provides definitive guidelines on how to 
do that.46 
Thus, when suit begins in federal court and the court issues an 
abstention order, the property owners at least know that there is 
authority describing their right to return to federal litigation, if they 
 
 41. 953 F.2d at 1302. 
 42. Id. Although the owners sought compensation for the taking of an avigation 
easement—the typical relief sought in airport noise litigation, see supra  note 40, the Florida 
Court of Appeals held that there was no taking because the owners were not deprived of all use 
of their entire properties. Fields v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 512 So. 2d 961, 965 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 43. 953 F.2d at 1302. 
 44. This most common form of abstention is generally called Pullman abstention. See 
Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).  
 45. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam, 375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964). 
 46. The judiciary has supplied only a series of cases holding that the methods devised by 
individual plaintiffs were not adequate, without ever saying what would be adequate. See, e.g., 
Lurie v. State, 633 F.2d 786, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1980); Cornwell v. Ferguson, 545 F.2d 1022, 
1025-26 (5th Cir. 1977); Reich v. City of Freeport, 527 F.2d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 1975); Lecci v. 
Cahn, 493 F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir. 1974); Godoy v. Gullota, 406 F. Supp. 692, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975). 
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follow the correct procedure in state court.47 In Fields, however, the 
litigation began in state court. And it began there because the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson County compelled it 
to begin there. 
What is a property owner to do? Easy, said the Eleventh Circuit.48 
When suit is filed in state court, the plaintiff can file the equivalent of 
an England reservation telling the state court that he is filing the state 
suit under the duress of Williamson County, that he is not submitting 
federal issues for decision, and that he will litigate the federal issues 
in federal court at the conclusion of the state proceedings.49 
So what happened to the Fields and their neighbors? They 
watched the wrong shell. They watched the shell marked exhaust 
your state court litigational remedies and did not notice the pea slip 
under the shell marked be sure to file a reservation of federal issues. 
In Palomar Mobilehome Park Association v. City of San 
Marcos,50 a California case involving a mobile home rent control 
challenge, the property owner filed suit first in state court. According 
to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the property owner filed no document 
reserving federal issues for federal litigation.51 The state court dealt 
with the federal claims, finding that no taking had occurred; doom. 
Palomar involved the same shell switch as in Fields, but the 
property owner’s contribution in Palomar was more overt; in the 
process of ripening his federal issues, the property owner over 
litigated and cooked them. Quoting a decision of the Third Circuit, 
the court curtly noted: 
 
 47. In candor, however, one ought at least pose the question of what purpose or policy is 
served by the “reservation” procedure. The courts have never explained, and the procedure 
seems, at best, an arbitrary hurdle placed in the path of people with legitimate federal questions. 
In England itself, Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion in which he called for a sua sponte 
reconsideration of the propriety of the entire Pullman doctrine. 375 U.S. at 423. Calling it “a 
legal research luxury” and “an unnecessary price to pay for our federalism,” he noted that 
“[m]any [litigants] can hardly afford one lawsuit, let alone two.” Id. at 425 (citing Clay v. Sun 
Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Given the realities of modern 
litigation, those sentiments are even more true now than when uttered thirty-six years ago. 
 48. Fields, 953 F.2 1299. 
 49. Id. at 1304-05. ‘How to make a state court judge feel like a law clerk for the federal 
judiciary’ in one easy lesson. 
 50. 989 F.2d 362. 
 51. Id. at 363. 
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Appellants have exhausted their state claims, which, under 
Williamson, is a necessary predicate to their federal cause of 
action; but in doing so, they received a full and fair 
adjudication of their constitutional claims against the City in 
state court. Due process guarantees them no less, but entitles 
them to no more.52 
Dealing with the ripeness issue as an abstract issue of due process 
begs the question. The issue is not whether the property owner had 
the opportunity for a full and fair state court adjudication, although 
that is plainly open to question in more cases than one is comfortable 
listing;53 the issue is whether a property owner can satisfy the 
Williamson County preconditions to federal litigation and then 
actually litigate the case in federal court. If that is a due process issue, 
it is of a very particularized kind; the kind that says that courts will 
not yank the rug out from under you as your reward for following the 
rules.54 The message of Fields and Palomar is that the property 
owner needs to keep an eye on the shell governing reservations of 
federal issues and all will be well. Right? Maybe. But, then again, 
maybe not.55 
 
 52. 989 F.2d 364 (citing Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d at 729 (3d Cir. 
1989)). 
 53. See supra  notes 31-38 and accompanying text. Alternatively, review the situation in 
California’s state courts as virtually every expert who has examined the situation has concluded 
that the California courts do not treat property owners fairly in land use litigation. See, e.g., 
WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY T AKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 226 (1995); 
DENNIS COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1993); RICHARD BABCOCK & 
CHARLES SIEMON, T HE ZONING GAME REVISITED 293 (1985); Gus Bauman, The Supreme 
Court, Inverse Condemnation, and the Fifth Amendment, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15, 70 (1983); David 
Callies, The Taking Issue Revisited, 37 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIG. 6, 7 (1985); Joseph F. 
DiMento et al., Land Development and Environmental Control in the California Supreme 
Court: The Deferential, the Preservationist, and the Preservationist-Erratic Eras, 27 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 859, 872 (1980). 
 54. The fast shuffle between state and federal courts, with the property owner losing all 
around, brings to mind Arthur Train’s charming stories about a wily New York lawyer named 
Ephraim Tutt. In one of them, Mr. Tutt displayed his legal acumen by convincing a federal 
court to dismiss an indictment of his client on the ground that the state courts had jurisdiction of 
the matter and then, when his client was indicted by state authorities, had the state court dismiss 
the case on the ground that the federal courts had jurisdiction. See Arthur Train, Mr. Tutt Plays 
It Both Ways, in MR. T UTT’S CASE BOOK 413 (1945). The story made for entertaining fiction; 
however, it makes for a sad commentary on the judicial system when nature imitates such art. 
 55. Another problem is that not one of the cases recognizing the reservation procedure in 
ripeness cases has actually permitted a claim to go to trial. This leads one to suspect that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/5
p+99+Berger.doc  1/10/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings 113 
 
 
The kicker in this series of cases is Mission Oaks Mobile Home 
Park v. City of Hollister,56 another rent control caper. After filing an 
action in state court challenging the validity of rent control ordinance 
and a mandamus petition challenging the validity of city action under 
the ordinance, the property owner filed a document entitled 
“Reservation to Litigate Federal Claims in the United States District 
Court.”57 The state court denied a number of motions by both sides.58 
The court denied the property owner’s motion for summary judgment 
and writ of mandamus and the city’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and motion to strike the reservation of federal issues.59 The 
remainder of the case was set for trial. Before the trial date, the 
property owner filed suit in federal court.60 
Did filing the reservation help? Not quite; the filing came too late. 
As the Ninth Circuit emphasized, the property owner did not file until 
over a year after the state complaint was filed.61 At this point, the 
state court had already ruled on many issues. Essentially the court 
treated the reservation of issues like a peremptory judicial 
disqualification, that is, one that must be made at the outset, before 
any action of consequence has taken place. 
The deadly twist introduced by Mission Oaks was a different 
branch of the abstention doctrine, the kind defined by Younger v. 
Harris.62 Younger abstention prevents federal disruption of on-going 
 
perhaps this procedure is simply a conscience-salving device, rather than a real remedy. That 
my dark suspicions on this score are justified is illustrated by the Ninth Circuit’s 
acknowledgement of the possible utility of such a reservation procedure in Dodd I, 59 F.3d at 
862, which it snatched away in Dodd II, 136 F.3d at 1227. In between the two Dodd decisions, 
the Ninth Circuit added to the confusion by saying that Dodd I “clearly holds that a court can 
reserve a federal issue so that the issue will not be precluded from further litigation, despite [an] 
assertion that [a] federal claim will necessarily be precluded by res judicata.” Macri v. King 
County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1130 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997). Without mentioning Macri, a different panel 
reached a contrary conclusion in Dodd II, thus rendering the Ninth Circuit in conflict with itself 
on this critical issue. No en banc consideration has ever straightened out this intra-Circuit 
aspect of the mess.  
 56. 989 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 57. Id. at 360. 
 58. Id. 
 59. 989 F.2d at 360. 
 60. Id.. 
 61. Id. at 362. 
 62. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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state court proceedings.63 The Younger court invoked abstention to 
prevent defendants in state court criminal trials from running across 
the street, filing federal civil rights actions, and throwing a wrench 
into the expeditious processing of the criminal calendar. But Younger 
abstention appears to be spreading. In Mission Oaks, for example, the 
court used it to prevent the plaintiff in the state court suit from 
interfering with the progress of his own state court proceedings by 
filing a federal court complaint.64 
The pernicious thing about Younger abstention is that, unlike 
Pullman abstention, it requires dismissal of the federal proceedings. 
Unlike Pullman abstention, Younger abstention provides that there 
can be no return to federal court after state court litigation. Mission 
Oaks held that Younger applied because of the state’s overriding 
interest in the enforcement of mobile home rent control laws.65 
Can that be? How does the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in 
Younger interact with its 1985 decision in Williamson County? Under 
the most literal reading of Mission Oaks, once a suit is filed in state 
court, Younger prohibits federal court litigation. Williamson County, 
however, requires state court litigation as a precondition to opening 
the federal courthouse door. Only three resolutions seem logically 
possible. 
First, a plaintiff who wants to preserve the option of having 
federal issues tried in federal court must file suit first in federal court. 
The complaint should include all causes of action, including one 
seeking just compensation for a taking under state law under the 
district court’s supplementary jurisdiction. Then, the property owner 
has to hope that the federal court will enter a Pullman abstention 
order permitting suit to be filed in state court about state law issues.66 
This option avoids the Younger problem because, at the time the 
federal complaint is filed, no state court suit will be pending. But, this 
option flaunts Williamson County, risking an angry reaction from a 
 
 63. Id. at 43. 
 64. 989 F.2d at 362. 
 65. Id. at 361. 
 66. This raises the bizarre spectacle of property owners filing their own motions 
immediately after filing their federal complaints asking the district judge to enter a Pullman 
abstention order so that they can litigate in state court free of res judicata concerns. This is not 
speculation; I have seen it done. 
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district court judge, and an order of dismissal rather than abstention; 
possible sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are also possible. Additionally, it is needlessly wasteful of 
the time, effort, and money of both court systems as well as the 
parties. 
Second, Mission Oaks is simply wrong.67 Under its rationale, the 
1971 Younger rule rendered the 1985 Williamson County rule 
stillborn. In short, there would never be a way to “ripen” a land use 
case for federal litigation; the mere filing of the state court complaint 
would invoke the spirit of Younger, banishing the matter from federal 
court forever. If that were the Supreme Court’s intent, Williamson 
County could have said so. Its holding could have been simple and 
straightforward: all takings litigation must be brought in state courts; 
federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain taking cases, even 
though they involve the application of the federal Constitution. 
Plainly, the Williamson County Court did not have that in mind, and 
said no such thing. Likewise, none of the lower courts have followed 
this interpretation. Younger abstention has no place in cases governed 
by Williamson County; the two cases are mutually exclusive. 
This should be apparent from any reading of Younger-type cases. 
The Younger court sensibly designed the rule to prevent criminal 
defendants in state court from interfering with those prosecutions by 
becoming civil rights plaintiffs in a complaint filed in federal court. 
The purpose of the rule was to stop federal courts from enjoining or 
frustrating pending state court prosecutions. 
Since its creation, Younger has seen some expansion, but 
generally only in cases with the same sort of prosecutorial flavor. 
Courts have applied it in order to prohibit interference with state 
cases involving temporary removal of a child in the context of child 
abuse,68 proceedings for the recovery of fraudulently obtained 
welfare benefits,69 state bar disciplinary proceedings,70 and state 
nuisance proceedings.71 Even as expanded, the essence of the 
 
 67. I prefer this is option, because it is the most honest approach to the problem. A little 
honesty would be useful in this field.  
 68. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 416 (1979). 
 69. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 416 (1977). 
 70. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423 (1981). 
 71. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975). 
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Younger rule has been to prevent the defendant in a state court 
proceeding from frustrating the state judicial process by jumping to 
the federal court with a plea to enjoin the state court proceeding.72 
Courts have not before this used it to prevent a state court plaintiff 
from filing parallel federal litigation.73 Here, again, there seems to be 
one law for “poor relation” land owners and another law for other 
litigants. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court refused to extend Younger abstention 
to challenges of completed actions by state and local governing 
bodies, specifically stating that Younger’s precepts of comity do not 
 
 72. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1977). 
 73. That is true even in the circuit that decided Mission Oaks. As another panel of the 
Ninth Circuit concluded at about the same time: 
At first  blush, it would seem the district court should have abstained under Younger. 
However, here, the ongoing state proceeding is a civil action. Civil-Younger abstention 
has been upheld only where a party seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction for the purpose 
of “restraining state proceedings or invalidating a state law.” 
Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. 
Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1402 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).  
We are unaware of any decision upholding civil-Younger abstention where the 
plaintiffs sought relief similar to that sought here. The Tribes do not seek by their 
federal court action to restrain any ongoing state proceeding. Although they assert the 
Montana Water Use Act cannot be used to regulate their water rights, they do not 
argue the Act is facially unconstitutional or invalid.  
Id. Other courts routinely agree with the Confederated Salish  view; but, of course, none of these 
cases was a land use case. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Whitburn, 975 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“Younger is confined to cases in which the federal plaintiff ha[s] engaged in conduct actually 
or arguably in violation of state law, thereby exposing himself to an enforcement proceeding in 
state court.”) (citing Alleghany Corp. v. Haase, 896 F.2d 1046, 1053 (7th Cir. 1990)); Kercado-
Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 1987) (“In Dayton Christian Schools 
and the other abstention cases noted above, the federal plaintiffs sought to enjoin a pending 
state proceeding which they did not initiate, but in which their presence was mandatory. Here, 
unlike Dayton Christian Schools, the administrative proceeding is remedial rather than 
coercive.”); Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Util. Comm’n., 791 F.2d 
1111, 1117 (3d Cir. 1986) (“In the typical Younger case, the federal plaintiff is a defendant in 
ongoing or threatened state court proceedings seeking to enjoin continuation of those state 
proceedings . . .. In this case, on the other hand, the federal plaintiffs . . . are also the state 
plaintiffs. Moreover, they are not seeking to enjoin any state judicial proceeding; instead, they 
simply desire to litigate what is admittedly a federal question in federal court . . ..”); Crawley v. 
Hamilton County Comm’rs, 744 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1984) (“In our case, the federal plaintiffs 
are also plaintiffs in the state court action. In addition, the plaintiffs are not attempting to use 
the federal courts to shield them from state court enforcement efforts. Accordingly, there is no 
basis for Younger abstention in this case.”). 
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apply to constitutional challenges to zoning ordinances.74 In a recent 
discussion of the rule, the Supreme Court explained that Younger 
precepts do not apply to state proceedings which are remedial in 
nature; that is, in cases where the plaintiff in the federal case is the 
party seeking some relief in a state forum. Rather, Younger applies to 
state proceedings which are coercive in nature; that is, in cases where 
the plaintiff in the federal case is the target of some state 
enforcement, criminal, or disciplinary process.75 In refusing a request 
for Younger abstention, the Seventh Circuit explained the necessity 
for restraining Younger’s reach: 
In essence the state is asking us to adopt a rule of abstention 
that whenever parallel state and federal suits are pending, the 
federal suit must be stayed and the federal claimant remitted to 
state court. The cases do not support such a rule, and it would 
be hard to square with 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), which explicitly 
grants the federal courts jurisdiction over civil suits arising 
under the Constitution. In every case that the state has cited the 
federal claimant had gone ahead and violated state law, thereby 
bringing into play the state’s interest in redressing violations of 
its laws in its own courts. The message of Younger and of the 
recent cases that have expanded its principle to civil 
proceedings is that one who decides to violate a state law that 
he believes to be unconstitutional may find that he has thereby 
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the state courts . . .. If 
the state’s position were correct, virtually no federal suit could 
 
 74. New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 372 (1989) (NOPSI). In 
NOPSI, the Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether to apply Younger to parallel state 
and federal proceedings initiated by the same party. The Court decided not to apply Younger. 
Indeed, the High Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s contrary application. Id. Despite the 
pendency of state court judicial proceedings which challenged a local administrative decision, 
the Supreme Court held that both actions could proceed: 
[T]here is no doctrine that the availability or even the pendency of state judicial 
proceedings excludes the federal courts. Viewed as it should be, as no more than a 
state-court challenge to completed legislative action, the Louisiana suit comes within 
none of the exceptions that Younger and later cases have established.  
Id. at 373.  
 75. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n. v. Dayton Christians Schools, 477 U.S. 619, 627 n.2 
(1986). 
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ever be brought to challenge the constitutionality of a state 
statute . . ..76 
Third, if the Mission Oaks conclusion is correct, then any 
application of it must be narrow and must rest on the two limitations 
present in that case: (1) the subject matter is mobilehome rent control, 
and (2) the reservation of rights was filed substantially after the 
complaint. Only such a narrow construction could approach making 
sense, though it does not quite get there. The Williamson County 
Court plainly did not believe that the general state land use laws 
before it (typical of laws in all states—many of which are merely 
variants of standardized model statutes) demonstrated sufficient state 
interest to oust federal courts of jurisdiction to consider constitutional 
takings claims. The only compatible reading of Mission Oaks is that 
mobilehome rent control laws may be sufficiently distinct and 
specific to justify this state interest. No court, however, has said that, 
and even that feels like a revisionist view of Williamson County. 
It may make sense to preclude property owners who test the 
litigation waters in state court from jumping to the federal forum 
midstream, without stating their intentions to do so previously. The 
possibilities for gamesmanship and forum shopping are apparent; 
Mission Oaks properly disallowed them. But in so doing, Mission 
Oaks threw out the proverbial baby with the unripe bath water. 
Slamming the federal courthouse door on a property owner who has 
filed in state court under compulsion of the Supreme Court’s ruling 
which has been enforced repeatedly by circuit and district courts, 
does not discourage gamesmanship;77 especially when the property 
owner forthrightly informed the state court and the defendants, from 
the outset, that federal questions are reserved for trial in federal court. 
However, the warning of Mission Oaks is clear: in addition to 
watching the pea and the shells, property owners need to examine the 
table. A trap door may exist through which the jurisdictional pea can 
disappear altogether. 
 
 76. Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir 1982). 
 77. On the contrary, it encourages gamesmanship by governmental defendants. See infra 
note 84. 
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IV. A SCREWBALL FROM THE SUPREME COURT: INTERNATIONAL 
SURGEONS 
As if things were not confused enough, the Supreme Court threw 
not just a curve, but a screwball, when it decided City of Chicago v. 
International College of Surgeons.78 In contrast to the routine 
regulatory taking case, in which the plaintiff property owners seek 
federal court review of local action, the city invoked federal 
jurisdiction in International Surgeons—and it succeeded. 
The College of Surgeons owned two buildings on Chicago’s 
lakefront that it planned to demolish and redevelop.79 The city 
declared them landmarks, which effectively ended that plan. So the 
Surgeons filed suit. As required by Williamson County, they filed 
their suit in state court. Because the complaint raised the federal 
constitutional question of whether the city’s actions had taken 
property without compensation, the city removed the case to federal 
court.80 
The district court assumed jurisdiction and entered summary 
judgment for the city. On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed, holding that the case was not properly subject to removal 
because the underlying issues involved review of municipal actions 
that were subject to a deferential standard of review and such 
administrative proceedings did not fit the definition of a “civil action” 
that could be removed from state to federal court.81 
On the city’s petition, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed again. To those who have long toiled in this particular legal 
vineyard, the result was stunning, and the reasoning was even more 
so. In contrast to all the cases discussed earlier in this article, the 
Supreme Court airily noted that “a facial challenge to an allegedly 
unconstitutional zoning ordinance is a claim which we would 
assuredly not require to be brought in state courts.”82 One is left 
figuratively, and perhaps literally, gasping for breath. Nowhere in 
 
 78. 522 U.S. 156 (1997). 
 79. Id. at 159-60. 
 80. Id. at 161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
 81. International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 91 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
 82. 522 U.S. at 159. 
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either the majority or the dissent is there any mention of Williamson 
County and the ripeness hurdles that ordinarily stand impregnably in 
the way of such an occurrence. Nowhere in the court’s opinion is 
there a reference to the abstention doctrine that is routinely used to 
close the federal courthouse door to any property owners who are 
able to allege ripe claims.83 Where property owners are routinely 
ushered to state courts, the City of Chicago was told that the claim 
made against it was one that the Court “would assuredly not require 
to be brought in state courts.” 
After International Surgeons the state of the law is that property 
owners have to file in state court, but regulators have a free hand to 
remove such cases to federal court at their whim because the owners 
“assuredly” could have brought the action in federal court to begin 
with.84 Alternatively the entire Williamson County line of ripeness 
decisions has been swept aside sub silencio . In the argot of today’s 
youth, “Yeah, right!”. 
V. ACADEMICS AND PRACTITIONERS ALIKE AGREE THAT THE 
INTERFACE BETWEEN WILLIAMSON COUNTY AND RES JUDICATA IS 
CONFUSED AND UNJUST 
Of all the aspects of regulatory taking law that critics have 
criticized as confusing, the ripeness doctrine of Williamson County 
has received the most.85 Further, “[o]ne of the most confusing aspects 
 
 83. For a particularly grotesque example, see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa 
Barbara , 96 F.3d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1996), in which the court held that the district court erred 
when it dismissed the complaint for lack of ripeness because it should have abstained instead. 
The plaintiff was a Wyoming corporation suing a California municipality under diversity 
jurisdiction. Id. at 407. Notwithstanding diversity jurisdiction’s purpose to shield such plaintiffs 
from the vicissitudes of state court litigation, both federal courts found a way to undercut 
federal jurisdiction and leave the matter to the state judiciary. 
 84. This removal game is out -of-hand. In Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1414 
(11th Cir. 1994), the county removed the case to federal court, preventing the state courts from 
processing the claim and then convinced the court to dismiss the case as unripe because it had 
not been first tried in state court. Id. at 1418. See also Simi Investment Co. v. Harris County, 13 
F. Supp.2d 603, 605 (S. D. Tex. 1998). If “chutzpah” had not already been amply illustrated, 
see Gerald Uelmen, Plain Yiddish For Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J. 78, 78-79 (1985), that ploy would 
do. 
 85. A recent, albeit pungent, illustration is Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the 
Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent 
Regulatory Takings Law?  30 URB. LAW. 307 (1998). 
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of the [Williamson County] decision . . .”86 is the requirement that 
federal claims be “ripened” in state court before presentation to a 
federal court. Land use law experts describe the lower court efforts as 
“riddled with obfuscation and inconsistency,”87 “unclear and 
inexact,”88 a “judicially created quagmire” and a “Kafkaesque 
maze.”89 
The primary target of this criticism is the outright deception of 
litigants wrought when Williamson County’s promise of a federal 
forum is dashed by the application of res judicata .90 That result has 
been criticized, even by those who think it is appropriate as 
“anomalous,” “surprising,”91 “unpleasant,”92 and “a trap for the 
unwary.”93 As Professor Roberts described it: “Certainly an anomaly 
exists: an unripe suit is barred at the moment it comes into existence. 
Like a tomato that suffers vine rot, it goes from being green to mushy 
red overnight. It can never be eaten.”94 
Part of the problem has been laid at the Supreme Court’s doorstep 
because of its “incomplete exposition;”95 the Court has never 
explained how Williamson County and the rules of claim and issue 
preclusion relate to each other. However, as Professor Mandelker and 
two of his Washington University colleagues stated: “[t]he Supreme 
Court could hardly have intended the ripeness rules to become a trap 
for federal litigants.”96 
 
 86. JAN LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION 10-20 (1999). 
 87. The testimony of Professor Daniel R. Mandelker before the House Judiciary 
Committee is reproduced in full at 31 URB. LAW. 234, 236 (1999). 
 88. ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., T HE T AKINGS ISSUE 67 (1999). 
 89. Timothy Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of 
Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 44, 51 (1992). 
 90. See Thomas Roberts, Fifth Amendment Taking Claims in Federal Court: The State 
Compensation Requirement and Principles of Res Judicata , 24 URB. LAW. 479, 480 (1992) 
(“Reliance on the ripeness rationale, unfortunately, suggests to property owners that their 
complaints will be ripe and heard in the federal courts after their state suits are over.”); See also 
Laitos,  supra note 86 (“This unfortunate result has produced an outcry from litigants who 
incorrectly assumed that compliance with [Williamson County] would eventually give them 
their day in federal court.”) 
 91. Roberts, supra note 13, at 64. 
 92. Roberts, supra note 90, at 480. 
 93. Meltz, supra  note 88, at 67. 
 94. Roberts, supra  note 13, at 68. Ripeness and Forum Selection at 68. 
 95. Stein, supra note 16, at 4. 
 96. DANIEL MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW 4A-23 (1998). 
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Unfortunately, regardless of the Court’s intent, a trap is what has 
become of the rules. Once property owners submit their claims to 
state courts, their risk of never seeing the inside of a federal 
courthouse is high. Before Congress, Professor Mandelker testified 
that his extensive review of the lower federal court decisions showed 
a “wholesale abdication of federal jurisdiction in law suits where 
issues are raised concerning the constitutional validity of land use 
regulation [because] federal judges have distorted the Supreme 
Court’s ripeness precedents to achieve [the] undeserved and 
unwarranted result [of] avoid[ing] the vast majority of takings cases 
on their merits.”97 
Even specialized scholars and informed attorneys are confused. 
Constituting a trap for the unwary, the present rule, or, more 
accurately, non-rule, “sometimes catches even the most careful and 
vigilant.”98 Thus, one keen observer concludes that “[t]his bar to the 
federal courts is almost complete,”99 while others optimistically opine 
that “a litigant with a Federal takings claim is not denied access to 
Federal court, but simply must pursue available State remedies before 
going to Federal court.”100 However, this optimism is unwarranted as 
at least four circuits take a diametrically opposite view. 
If, under Williamson County, property owners are the only 
constitutional claimants who must ripen their federal claims in state 
courts, concepts of claim and issue preclusion need to be applied in 
such a way that Williamson County’s promise of an eventual federal 
hearing is preserved. In one of its recent land use cases, the Supreme 
Court expressed its philosophy towards enforcing the protections of 
the Bill of Rights as follows: “We see no reason why the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights 
as the First Amendment or the Fourth Amendment, should be 
 
 97. See supra  note 87. 
 98. Meltz, supra note 88, at 67. 
 99. Roberts, supra note 90, 480. 
 100. Glenn Sugameli, “Takings” Bills Threaten People, Property, Zoning, and the 
Environment, 31 URB. LAW. 177, 187 (1999) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Mr. 
Sugameli is one of the most vocal defenders of the status quo. Cynics might view his argument 
as eyewash intended to deceive Congress into believing that the law is working fairly and that 
there is no need for reform. Statistics collected by others belie his assertion. See, e.g., Delaney, 
supra  note 3, at 202. 
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relegated to the status of a poor relation . . ..”101 
That philosophy requires additional support to make it real. Until 
the draconian ripeness rules are revised so that property owners may, 
like all other citizens, seek immediate federal court protection when 
their federal constitutional rights are infringed, any protection offered 
by the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment will remain a poor 
relation. 
A. Property Owners Complaining of Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment Violations Are the Only Ones Required to Run a State 
Court Litigational Gauntlet Before They May Seek Relief From a 
U.S. District Court. There is No Rational Justification for This 
Disparity of Treatment 
Presently, property owners’ Fifth Amendment rights de facto  
remain a poor relation as compared to others in the Bill of Rights. 
People who are prosecuted in state courts may be required to raise 
their federal constitutional defenses on pain of losing their ability to 
litigate them later.102 The same may be true of those who actively 
seek recompense under the aegis of state law in state courts for 
violation of their civil rights.103 No other federally protected rights 
have the Williamson County precondition to federal litigation. All 
other federally protected rights may be vindicated in federal court 
without first having to pass through a state court filter, if the plaintiff 
so chooses. Indeed, the rule seems to be that the more unsavory the 
litigant, the higher the level of constitutional scrutiny. The 
protections routinely provided to Nazis and Klansmen is legendary. 
The same is true with accused felons whose guilt is beyond dispute 
 
 101. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994). 
 102. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). 
 103. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 (1984). In 
Migra , the Court held that res judicata and collateral estoppel will bar a subsequent federal suit 
if the would-be federal litigant voluntarily filed the state court suit and could have, but did not, 
raise his federal claims in state court. Id. at 85. Absent both halves of that  formula, federal 
litigation is permissible. The Migra  analysis contained a reference to the earlier decision in 
England. Id. at 85 n.7. Thus, when it decided Migra , the Supreme Court was conscious of the 
need to preserve the federal forum for those forced into state court against their will, but not 
necessarily for those who voluntarily submit to the state court’s jurisdiction. Because of that 
recognition, the Court limited the preclusive effect of the full faith and credit clause to those 
who voluntarily submit to state court jurisdiction. 
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and has even been duly adjudicated. Property owners seeking only to 
make productive use of land are at the bottom of the Bill of Rights 
protection list.104 
Federal court protection is also routinely provided in land use 
cases involving other aspects of the Bill of Rights.105 For example, 
the validity of local land use ordinances regulating sexually explicit 
work has been challenged in federal court under the First 
Amendment.106 In these cases, there is no requirement of first 
presenting the issues to state courts, even though they implicate the 
same zoning policies and ordinances as other land use cases and even 
though in these cases courts apply “contemporary community 
standards.” 
Similarly, First Amendment cases dealing with the establishment 
of religion are litigated first in federal courts, without any required 
stopover in state courts, even when they implicate local land use 
issues.107 The same is true of cases dealing with education, where 
federal courts decide questions of religious involvement without any 
assistance from state courts.108 In Monroe v. Pape,109 the federal 
courts reviewed a petitioner’s claim that the Chicago police had 
 
 104. When, for example, has the American Civil Liberties Union appeared as a friend of 
the court to defend the civil rights of property owners? The answer, regardless of the issue, is 
never.  
 105. A personal sore point remains in National Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 
1158, 1160 (4th Cir. 1991). This is a case about billboard amortization, in which the company 
challenged an ordinance on both First and Fifth Amendment grounds. Id. Although the court 
eventually  upheld the ordinance against both challenges, the court’s analysis was amazing. The 
Fifth Amendment claim was dismissed because it was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 
1168. It took the court endless pages of agonizing before it concluded that  the claim could not 
proceed. Id. at 1161-68. When the court then turned to the First Amendment, however, the court 
found no statute of limitations problem: The court addressed the issue on the merits. The court 
reasoned that, “it is doubtful that an ordinance facially offensive to the First Amendment can be 
insulated from challenge by a statutory limitations period . . ..” Id. at 1168. Why should one 
facial invalidity under the Bill of Rights be shielded by limitations, but not the other? The only 
explanat ion is the poor relation status of property rights protection. The Supreme Court, 
however, denied certiorari in this case. 504 U.S. 931 (1992). 
 106. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986); See also Young 
v. American Mini Theat res Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976). 
 107. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); First Assembly of God v. Collier 
County, 20 F.3d 419, 420 (11th Cir. 1994); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).  
 108. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); School District of the City of Grand 
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Abingdon School Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 
(1963). 
 109. 365 U.S. 167, 170-83 (1961) 
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violated his fourth Amendment rights, and did so without requiring 
him first to seek relief in state court.110 This also applies to claims of 
racial segregation.111 
The cases cited above deal with parallel features of the Bill of 
Rights, which are routinely protected in federal court through 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs in § 1983 cases were able to proceed 
directly to federal district courts to seek redress for alleged violations 
of their federally protected rights.112 Why are property owners 
required to go first to state court in order to ripen their federal taking 
claims?113 When viewed in the broader context of federal law, the 
rationale of Williamson County does not survive scrutiny.114 
If, as the Court told us in Dolan, rights protected by the property 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are indeed not to be 
relegated to the status of a poor relation, then one of two things needs 
to happen. Either the court must reconsider Williamson County, or the 
court must reconcile the concepts of claim and issue preclusion with 
Williamson County in a manner that preserves the state court ripening 
process while also preserving the aggrieved citizens’ rights. This 
includes preserving federal court jurisdiction to determine the validity 
of their federal constitutional claims. By forcing property owners to 
 
 110. Id. at 183. 
 111. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). 
 112. For example, at the behest of aggrieved citizens, federal courts have involved 
themselves in the local intricacies of city budget policy, Berkley v. Common Council, 63 F.3d 
295, 296 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), county law enforcement policy, Turner v. Upton County, 
915 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1990), municipal policy governing the use of force during arrests, 
Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 967 (3d Cir. 1996), county road acquisition policy, 
Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1988), municipal employment 
policy, Richardson v. Leeds Police Dept., 71 F.3d 801, 803 (11th Cir. 1995), city medical care 
policy, Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1049 (3d Cir. 1991), school district 
sexual abuse policy, Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. School Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 746 (5th Cir. 1993), 
police department sexual harassment policy, Gares v. Willingboro Twp., 90 F.3d 720, 722 (3d 
Cir. 1996), and even the question whether “extortion of outsiders, businessmen, or developers” 
was town policy, Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 575-76 (1st Cir. 1996).  
 113. See Kassouni, supra note 89, at 2 (“The net result is a special ripeness doctrine 
applicable only to constitutional property rights claims.”). See also  William A. Fischel, 
REGULATORY T AKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 55 (1995): Delaney & Desiderio, 
Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness Mess”? A Call for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter 
the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 198 (1999); Stein, supra note 16, at 13-14; for a 
discussion of the justification offered by the Court in Williamson County and its transparent 
unsoundness, see Kanner, supra note 85, at 327-28. 
 114. See Kanner, supra note 85, at 327-28. 
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proceed through a hopeless morass of state court procedures through 
this misapplication of the doctrine of res judicata , those plaintiffs 
will never see the inside of a federal courthouse. Therefore, the “poor 
relation” status of their constitutional protection is guaranteed. 
B. Because of the Importance the Supreme Court has Always Placed 
on the Ability of Constitutional Plaintiffs to Have Access to Federal 
Courts, A Mechanical Application of Ordinary Precepts of Claim and 
Issue Preclusion Should Not be Used to Bar the Courthouse Doors 
After Property Owners Comply with the “Ripeness” Requirements of 
Williamson County; That Makes the Court’s Holding Self-Stultifying 
Both before and after Williamson County, the Supreme Court’s 
cases have uniformly held that suits seeking redress under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 belong in federal court, regardless of the possibility of 
obtaining relief in state court, because federal courts are uniquely 
suited and intended to adjudicate federal issues. Section 1983 was 
intended to provide “a uniquely federal remedy”115 with “broad and 
sweeping . . . protection”116 so that individuals in a wide variety of 
factual situations are able to obtain a federal remedy when their 
federally  protected rights are abridged.117 While read against the 
general common law tort background, “[t]he coverage of the statute 
[§ 1983] is . . . broader,”118 and courts must broadly and liberally 
construe it to achieve its goals.119 “[T]he central purpose of the 
Reconstruction-Era laws is to provide compensatory relief to those 
deprived of their federal rights by state actors”120 by “interpos[ing] 
the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of 
the people’s federal rights . . ..”121 Williamson County stands this 
doctrine on its head by asserting that state courts not only may be 
interposed between the people and the federal vindication of their 
 
 115. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972). 
 116. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1972). 
 117. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50, 55 (1984). 
 118. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997). 
 119. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989); 
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l. Plan. Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1979). 
 120. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988). 
 121. Mitchum , 407 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added). 
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rights against misbehaving land regulatory functionaries, but indeed 
must be interposed. 
On several occasions, the Court examined the background of 
§ 1983. The seminal decision in Monroe, for example, concluded: 
The debates were long and extensive. It is abundantly clear 
that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a 
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, 
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not 
be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of 
rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies. It is no 
answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give 
relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state 
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused 
before the federal one is invoked.122 
In Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court again examined 
the Congressional debates preceding the adoption of § 1983, and 
concluded that Congress intended to “throw open the doors of the 
United States courts” to those who had been deprived of 
constitutional rights “and to provide these individuals immediate 
access to the federal courts . . ..”123 
If, as the Court has repeatedly held, Congress intended for § 1983 
plaintiffs to have their cases tried in federal courts if they so opted, 
then some modification of the general standards for claim and issue 
preclusion seems mandated. Otherwise, the law creates a class of 
constitutional pariahs who may never litigate their federal 
constitutional claims in federal court. Williamson County segregates 
this one type of § 1983 litigation and, instead of providing 
“immediate access to the federal courts,” requires a ripening 
procedure that absolutely precludes access to the federal courts. As 
Professor Laitos recently stated: “The combined effect of 
[Williamson County], res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the full 
faith and credit statute is to make a takings claim moot, and 
 
 122. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180-83 (emphasis added). The same theme appears in McNeese 
v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963). 
 123. 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982) (emphasis added). 
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precluded, if a property owner takes all the necessary steps to make 
the claim ripe.”124 The Congress that sought to “interpose the federal 
courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s 
federal rights”125 could not have intended this result. Moreover, if 
state court litigation legally precludes these § 1983 plaintiffs from 
federal court, then not only are constitutional plaintiffs at the mercy 
of state courts, but also state courts then get to define the contours of 
federal law and are de facto  free to trump the federal courts’ 
interpretation of federal law. This is a rather grotesque result that 
makes hash out of the federal supremacy clause.126 Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, however, forbids that sort of power to the states. After 
all, this kind of litigation is all about federal rights. State courts 
cannot be granted the power to define federal claims: “‘Congress,’ 
we have previously noted, ‘surely did not intend to assign to state 
courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of 
defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause 
of action.’”127 
It is one thing for the Court to invoke a rule of prudential 
ripeness,128 and ask state courts to determine the extent of the 
remedies they offer under the circumstances. It is something quite 
different to overlay doctrines of claim and issue preclusion on the 
state courts’ answers, and thereby enable states to flatly deny federal 
constitutional rights to property owners. This difference was 
dramatically illustrated by the Rainey Brothers case. In other words, 
this misguided approach grants states the power to deny access to 
federal courts; a consequence that is unseemly when one considers 
that § 1983 was enacted precisely to avoid that result. By granting 
preclusive effect to either the entire claim presented to the state court 
or to discrete issues litigated, the interpretation of Williamson County 
by the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits flies in the face of 
 
 124. Laitos, supra  note 86, at 10-25. 
 125. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243. 
 126. U.S. CONST., Art. VI, § 2. The result gives rise to a sub rosa  resuscitation of the 
interposition doctrine that reared its head briefly in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), only to be interred in  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 127. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 144 (1988) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 
(1985). 
 128. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1997). 
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settled § 1983 jurisprudence. In fact, this is contrary to what the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged in the abstention context. How, 
and where, a case is tried can be critical, and plaintiffs who desire to 
try their federal claims in federal court cannot be compelled to accept 
a state court’s factual determinations. 
It is true that, after a post-abstention determination and 
rejection of his federal claims by the state courts, a litigant 
could seek direct review in this Court. But such review . . . is 
an inadequate substitute  for the initial District Court 
determination . . . to which the litigant is entitled in the federal 
courts. This is true as to issues of law; it is especially true as to 
issues of fact. Limiting the litigant to review here would deny 
him the benefit of a federal trial court’s role in constructing a 
record and making fact findings. How the facts are found will 
often dictate the decision of federal claims. It is the typical, not 
the rare, case in which constitutional claims turn upon the 
resolution of contested factual issues.[129] There is always in 
litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding. 
Thus in cases where, but for the application of the abstention 
doctrine, the primary fact determination would have been by 
the District Court, a litigant may not be unwillingly deprived of 
that determination. The possibility of appellate review by this 
Court of a state court determination may not be substituted, 
against a party’s wishes, for his right to litigate his federal 
claims fully in federal courts.130 
Thus, as the Court acknowledged in abstention cases, it now 
seems necessary, as the lowest level of protection affordable to Fifth 
Amendment property rights, for the Court to acknowledge that in the 
unique class of land use ripeness cases a trial in state court may be a 
precondition designed to weed out the cases where relief is granted 
 
 129. Recent law emphasizes this important point. In federal actions brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, such factual determinations may be made by a jury. See City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999). Thus, the ripeness doctrine not only strips landowners of 
their right to litigate their federal claims in a federal forum, but, adding insult to injury, also 
denies them their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial as well when they sue under § 1983. 
 130. England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-417 (1964) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted (emphasis added)). 
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by state law. Obtaining state court relief may moot the federal issue, 
but unsuccessful state court litigation “may not be substituted, against 
a party’s wishes, for his right to litigate his federal claims fully in 
federal courts.” 
The Court has extensive experience with the relationship between 
state and federal courts in a different, yet analogous, field—federal 
habeas corpus petitions, an area of the law that likewise rejects the 
notion of preclusion. Habeas petitioners are required to present their 
federal constitutional issues to state court before seeking federal court 
relief. This procedure ensures that state courts have the opportunity to 
correct their own constitutional violations before they are brought 
before a federal district court.131 The requirement to repair first to the 
state courts, and to present all of the state and federal constitutional 
issues that will eventually be raised in federal court, is not 
jurisdictional;132 but it is nonetheless required.133 
Having presented all of the federal constitutional issues to the 
state court for adjudication, and having received an unfavorable 
response, is the habeas corpus petitioner subjected to res judicata  and 
full faith and credit arguments upon arriving in federal Court? No. 
The Supreme Court put it plainly in Wainwright v. Sykes: “It is not 
res judicata .”134 If submitting federal constitutional issues to a state 
court for review does not preclude later federal examination of those 
same issues, then a fortiori, the forced submission of state 
constitutional issues to a state court should not, indeed cannot, 
logically preclude later adjudication of federal constitutional issues 
by a federal court in this Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment context. 
No intellectually defensible reason expla ins why property owners 
in § 1983 cases should be confronted with the bar of res judicata  
when they seek to enter the federal courthouse doors that were 
supposedly “throw[n] open” to them by § 1983,135 so that they would 
have a federal forum in which to litigate their federal claims. 
 
 131. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). 
 132. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989). 
 133. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 119 S.Ct. 1728 (1999). 
 134. 433 U.S. 72, 80 (1977) (emphasis added). 
 135. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504. 
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CONCLUSION 
The land use ripeness cases have not been the judiciary’s finest 
hour. Although garbed in intellectual robes and couched in 
jurisprudential terminology like res judicata , collateral estoppel, and 
due process, the result simply has been unintelligible. The courts 
have presented a pile of meaningless legalistic verbiage, the sort of 
thing that gives lawyers and judges a bad name. 
That is not said lightly, and it is said more in sadness than in 
anger. I retain the highest respect for the judiciary as an institution.136 
But no matter how respectable the institution, its handiwork must still 
pass intellectual muster on its own merits. It is simply impossible to 
analyze the obtuse intellectual maze of land use ripeness decisions 
inflicted since the early 1980s and come away doing anything but 
shaking one’s head in dazed wonder.137 These cases are bewildering. 
Set aside, for the moment, the idea that no principled justification 
exists for making property owners jump extra hurdles to enable them 
to obtain federal court protection of their federal constitutional rights. 
If one takes Williamson County at face value, there is not a lot of 
subtlety to it. Either the Supreme Court meant something when it 
decided Williamson County, or it did not. If the latter is true, the 
Court was merely uttering meaningless rhetoric, with no more 
purpose than to stave off the day of intellectual reckoning. If, 
however, the Supreme Court meant what it repeatedly said, that a 
claim for just compensation for a regulatory taking of property is ripe 
for litigation on the merits in federal district court once a final, 
unfavorable regulatory decision has been issued by the state courts 
 
 136. I am even on record to that effect. See Michael M. Berger & Richard D. Norton, An 
Independent Judiciary: Society’s Bulwark, Verdict Magazine, 1998, at 18. 
 137. There is a huge and unjustified difference between land use ripeness cases and all 
other ripeness cases. In other fields, the courts have shown a remarkable ability to make sense. 
For example, the Supreme Court’s general rule of ripeness is said to be applied in a “pragmatic 
way.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). In general, for ripeness to be 
present there must be “a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, 
of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant” judicial intervention. Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). Significantly, outside the land use field, such 
controversies are ripe for litigation even before regulations are applied, as long as “expected 
conformity to them causes injury . . ..” Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 
419 (1942) (emphasis added). Ironically, those requirements are fulfilled in virtually every 
constitutional land use case that has been dismissed nonetheless for lack of ripeness.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p+99+Berger.doc  1/10/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 Festschrift [Vol. 3:99 
 
 
then it is incumbent on the lower federal courts to give meaning to 
that decision. They cannot, with any degree of intellectual honesty, 
apply by rote the general precepts of claim and issue preclusion 
without noting the destructive impact on those general rules of the 
core holding of Williamson County. It is axiomatic that, decisions 
which are either later in time, or specific rather than general, prevail; 
Williamson County was both. Whether by design or blunder, the 
Supreme Court justices created a system in which they instructed 
property owners with constitutional claims to litigate the same factual 
case twice: once, under state law in state court, and then, if they so 
chose, again in federal court under federal law. It is simply 
impermissible to say that when the Supreme Court did so, it meant to 
create a system in which property owners are deliberately duped into 
giving up their right to federal litigation of federal constitutional 
issues because they do their best to comply with Williamson County’s 
clear holding. That would be too cruel to contemplate. 
Likewise, in Younger situations, the mere filing of an earlier suit 
in state court automatically requires dismissal of any duplicative suit 
filed later in federal court. But, under Williamson County, claims are 
not ripe for litigation in federal district court until relief has been 
sought and denied in state court. Thus, if Younger applies routinely, 
then the very compliance with the mandate of Williamson County 
automatically triggers Younger and prevents the property owner from 
ever ripening a case in the manner prescribed by Williamson County. 
Younger was decided four years before Williamson County; surely, 
the Supreme Court must have been aware of it. Again, it cannot be 
presumed that the Court thus concocted a procedural morass that is 
self-stultifying in operation. 
The lower federal courts, however, have surely made a hash of 
things. Their decisions bear all the earmarks of result-orientation run 
amok. For whatever reason, they simply do not like land use cases, at 
least when they implicate regulatory takings.138 As a consequence, 
 
 138. I have lost count of the number of times federal courts have complained about 
attempts to make them “the grand mufti of planning,” or a “super zoning board of appeals,” as 
though there were something less savory about reviewing municipal land use activities than 
municipal jail conditions or other forms of governmental constitutional misfeasance. See, e.g., 
Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989); Coniston Corp. v. Village 
of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988). But miraculously, when they deem the 
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those courts have de facto  refused to enforce Williamson County as 
plainly written and have transmogrified it into some sort of all-
purpose bar to federal litigation of this one, specific federal 
constitutional guarantee. 
That is why, in frustration, people concerned about the 
constitutional rights of property owners have turned to Congress and 
sought to have federal court jurisdictional statutes augmented. People 
want to make clear that cases involving regulatory excesses of the 
land use variety can have their federal constitutional aspects litigated 
before federal judges. 
In fairness, and in defense of the integrity of our constitutional 
system, it is time for the Supreme Court to rethink Williamson 
County. The decision has been on the books for a decade and a half, 
and it has done nothing but pollute the federal case reports and 
unjustly bar the victims of municipal overregulation from their day in 
federal court. Instead of providing orderly adjudication, it has sent 
them on a jurisdictional search for some sort of Holy Grail that 
claims most victims by exhaustion, and for those who survive their 
trip through the gauntlet, by the wooden application of doctrines of 
preclusion and dismissal. 
Where is Justice William O. Douglas now that we really need 
him? For better or for worse, he left the bench before the binge of 
land use ripeness cases began. He held forth on the problems of 
requiring multi-court litigation in the context of abstention, and his 
thoughts bear repetition—nay, broadcast—today. Twenty years after 
Pullman, he said: “I was a member of the Court that launched 
Pullman and sent it on its way. . . [b]ut if I had realized the creature it 
was to become, my doubts would have been far deeper than they 
were.”139 In words that have since become all too familiar when 
 
contested land use issues to be “politically  correct” federal courts have no trouble acting as 
“zoning boards of appeals.” See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 
(1974). 
 139. England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 425 (1964). When the 
Supreme Court decided Pullman in 1941, the case was a comparatively straightforward task to 
litigate in state courts and to get a definitive adjudication of the underlying state law issue. 
Today, however, with state supreme courts denying discretionary review in the vast majority of 
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dealing with the ripeness mess, he called abstention “a trap for the 
unwary,”140 “something of a Frankenstein,”141 and “an unnecessary 
price to pay for our federalism.”142 Noting that “res judicata is not a 
constitutional principle,”143 he railed against any procedure that 
would penalize litigants whose only sin was to follow the procedures 
mandated by the Supreme Court: “Any presumption should work the 
other way—that he who is required to go to the state courts and does 
what we require him to do when he gets there, is not there voluntarily 
and does not forsake his federal suit . . ..”144 
Most of all, Justice Douglas became concerned about the 
inordinate consumption of time and resources that multi-court 
litigation demanded, fearing that plaintiffs “will be ground down 
slowly by the passage of time and the expenditure of money in state 
proceedings, leaving the ultimate remedy here, at least in many cases, 
an illusory one.”145 I can do no better than to conclude by quoting, as 
did Justice Douglas, an earlier Douglas dissent expressing the 
fundamental unfairness of the process that abstention, and now land 
use ripeness, had become: 
Shuttling the parties between state and federal tribunals is a 
sure way of defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice 
is not an academic exercise. There are no foundations to 
finance the resolution of nice state law questions involved in 
federal court litigation. The parties are entitled—absent unique 
and rare situations—to adjudication of their rights in the 
tribunals which Congress has empowered to act.146 
The parties certainly are so entitled; land use cases are no less 
than any other matter of constitutional import. It is time for the 
 
cases, and with intermediate state appellate courts deciding most cases by unpublished, and, 
thus uncitable opinions, a detour through state courts can be, and often is, little more than a 
waste of time and money that in the end fails to produce the sought-after clarification of state 
law. 
 140. Id. at 433. 
 141. Id. at 429. 
 142. Id. at 426. 
 143. Id. at 429. 
 144. 375 U.S. at 429 (emphasis in original). 
 145. Id. at 436-37. 
 146. Id. at  425 (quoting Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. at 228 (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
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Supreme Court to reclaim for the federal courts their historic role as 
defenders of the Constitution, with respect to the last clause of the 
fifth Amendment as well as its siblings in the Bill of Rights. Then, 
property owners no longer will be the constitutional poor relations the 
Court decried in Dolan. 
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